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INTRODUCTION
Obtaining a patent is only one step in the journey. There is a
plethora of paths that a patent owner can take, including licensing or
assigning their patent rights to others. The question then
becomes what powers and rights does that licensee or buyer have?
Can the licensee or buyer bring infringement suits based on those
patents? Do they need to join the original patent owner to do so? As
was outlined in Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The All
Substantial Rights Doctrine in Action (“Standing with a Bundle
of Sticks”),1 courts look to the “all substantial rights” standard to
answer those questions.
This Supplement to the prior Article provides a brief update on
the all substantial rights doctrine in view of the Federal Circuit’s
recent decision in Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Technology Corp.2 This Supplement begins by summarizing the all substantial rights doctrine framework, specifically highlighting which
rights within the bundle have been found to be most important. This
Supplement then examines Lone Star, concluding that the Court’s
holding fits within the framework that was previously established
by the Federal Circuit and discussed in Standing with a Bundle
of Sticks.
I. THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
It is a long-established principle that a patent confers a “bundle
of rights” which grants the patentee certain powers and protections,
including the power to retain all rights or divide and assign portions
of those rights.3 However, only the owner of all substantial rights in
the patent may bring suit to enforce the patent on its own, without
the need to join another party. The issue of who owns all the substantial rights, and therefore who may bring suit on its own, often
1

Mark J. Abate & Christopher J. Morten, Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The All
Substantial Rights Doctrine in Action, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 477
(2018) [hereinafter Standing with a Bundle of Sticks].
2
925 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
3
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (noting that a patent provides its owner with “a bundle of rights which may be
divided and assigned, or retained in whole or part”).
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arises when an exclusive licensee desires to bring an infringement action.
Federal Circuit decisions, including WiAV Solutions LLC v.
Motorola, Inc., recognize that an exclusive licensee has constitutional standing to sue an infringer.4 However, in order for a
party to bring suit on its own, it must also satisfy additional standing
concerns, known as the “prudential standing” doctrine.5 The Supreme Court in Allen v. Wright stated:
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and
the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.6
Courts have considered numerous prudential standing concerns in
the context of patent infringement.7 Ultimately, however, “the question is ‘who owns the patent?’”8 To answer this question, the Federal
Circuit looks to see which rights in the bundle have been transferred
and whether the buyer possesses all substantial rights.
A. The Most Important Rights in the Bundle: The Right to
Enforce, The Right to Indulge, and The Right to Alienate
Although no singular right is dispositive, the Federal Circuit has
developed a pattern of analyzing which rights are the most
crucial in determining who possesses all substantial rights in the patent.9 Among the numerous rights conferred to patent owners,10 one
right in particular has risen to the top of the list as the most
4

Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 482.
E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also
Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 483.
6
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
7
Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 483–85.
8
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
9
See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 488–91.
10
Id.
5

2020]

THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE

1189

important: the right to enforce the patent. Courts have consistently
held that agreements which provide a buyer an unencumbered right
to enforce the patent is indicative of the buyer holding all substantial
rights. Similarly, courts have held time after time that hindrances on
the ability of a buyer to sue alleged infringers is a strong indication
that all substantial rights were not transferred.11 For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
an exclusive licensee possessed less than all substantial rights in a
patent, given that, inter alia, the licensee was “obligated under the
agreement not to ‘prejudice or impair the patent rights [of the licensor] in connection with [the licensee’s own litigation].’”12 The Court
concluded that the licensee “may not sue on its own for infringement,”13 acknowledging that the exclusive right to sue is “particularly dispositive.”14
Second to the right to enforce and of potentially equal
importance15 is the right to indulge infringement, i.e., the right to
allow infringement. In Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., the agreement allowed the licensor
to bring an infringement suit against an alleged infringer if the
licensee chose not to.16 The Federal Circuit held that “[b]ecause [the
11
See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs. v. Hyundai Motor Amer., 823 F.3d 615, 620–21
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978–
79 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12
Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (quoting the agreement at issue in the case); see also,
e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21 (noting that the seller retained
significant control over the buyer’s enforcement and litigation activities transferring only
limited enforcement rights, and concluding on the basis of this and other factors that fewer
than all substantial rights had been transferred); Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F.
Supp. 3d 421, 434 (D. Del. 2014) (holding that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer than
all substantial rights in a patent, given that, inter alia, the licensor could “circumvent [the
licensee’s] decision to allow infringement and, instead, bring suit directly as a counterplaintiff”).
13
Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132.
14
Id. (quoting Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d
870, 875–76 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); see also Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at
496.
15
See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 499; see also Abbott Labs.,
47 F.3d at 1132 (observing that “the right to indulge infringements . . . normally
accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue”); Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978
(noting the holding in Abbott Labs).
16
604 F.3d at 1362–63.
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licensee] cannot indulge infringements for an unlimited time . . .
[the licensee] holds substantially less than the complete right
to sue.”17
Lastly, a licensee’s power to alienate (e.g., to sell, transfer, or
reassign) its rights in the patent is arguably the next most important
stick in the bundle.18 If an agreement places significant restrictions
or limitations on the power to assign full rights in the patent to a
future buyer, the agreement is unlikely to be found to transfer all
substantial rights.19
The Federal Circuit’s precedent leading up to Lone Star is fairly
clear that, while the totality of factors must be considered, meaningful restrictions on the buyer’s right to enforce the patents beyond
those already in existence are very likely to prevent the transfer of
all substantial rights in the patent. Therefore, the question this Supplement endeavors to answer next is: Did the holding in Lone Star
change this precedent?
B. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp.
The Federal Circuit’s decision and reasoning in Lone Star fits
squarely within the framework developed in its previous cases and
again highlights the importance of an unfettered right to enforce
the patents in the analysis of whether all substantial rights have
been transferred.
1. Background
The dispute in Lone Star arose from a patent transfer agreement
(“Agreement”) between Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC (“Lone
Star”) and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“AMD”).20 The Agreement purported “to transfer ‘all right, title and interest’ in the patents
to Lone Star.”21 However, the Agreement also included several
17

Id. at 1363.
Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 498.
19
See, e.g., Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978–79 (finding that a licensor’s retention of a right
to veto an exclusive licensee’s attempts to reassign its license was concordantly a factor in
finding that all substantial rights had not been transferred).
20
Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
21
Id.
18
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notable limitations on Lone Star’s rights.22 For example, the Agreement only allowed Lone Star to assert the patents against the “Unlicensed Third Party Entit[ies]” specifically listed in the Agreement.23
The Agreement also allowed AMD, without Lone Star’s approval,
to sublicense the covered patents to any unlisted entity that Lone
Star sues.24 Additionally, the Agreement limited Lone Star’s power
to assign the patents, i.e., the power to alienate, as well as allow the
patents to enter the public domain.25 It is also noteworthy that the
Agreement required Lone Star to share with AMD between 35 and
50 percent of any revenue it generated from licensing the patents.26
In late 2016, Lone Star filed six related infringement suits
against parties specifically listed as Unlicensed Third Party Entities
in the Agreement.27 Each of the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the basis that Lone Star had no standing to sue
under the Agreement.28 In reaching its decision, the district court
concluded that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the patents to Lone Star, and therefore Lone Star could not sue in its own
name alone. 29 In the view of the district court, the “essence of this
problem is that the patent owner tried to find a way to shield itself
from counterclaims while retaining a way to reap the monetary benefits of suing competitors and others for infringement of its patents.”30 The district court subsequently dismissed all six cases and
Lone Star appealed.31
22
In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, No. C 17-03980 WHA, 2018 WL 500258,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations
LLC v. Semiconductor Mfg. Int’l Corp., No. 2018-1578, 2018 WL 3869293 (Fed. Cir. June
12, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Toshiba Corp.,
No. 2018-1578, 2018 WL 3869301 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2018), and vacated and remanded
sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
23
Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1227–28.
24
Id. at 1228.
25
Id.
26
Id.; In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1.
27
In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1.
28
Id.
29
Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1228–29.
30
In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1.
31
Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1229 (2019).
The district court also denied Lone Star’s request to join AMD into the case as the Court
concluded “that doing so would ‘reward Lone Star for its litigation gimmick and unfairly
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2. All Substantial Rights Analysis
At the heart of the Federal Circuit’s analysis was whether or not
Lone Star possessed all substantial rights and therefore could sue in
its own name. However, before diving into its analysis, the Court
again emphasized the unimportance of the form or labels included
in a transfer agreement.32 Although the Agreement purported to
transfer “all right, title and interest” in the covered patents, the Court
emphasized that the “analysis in these types of cases has never been
so reliant on labels.”33 Instead, as the Court has done previously, it
examined the “totality” of the Agreement and whether it “reflects a
transfer of all substantial rights in the asserted patents.”34
As discussed above, “[the Court has] often focused on two
salient rights; enforcement and alienation.”35 These are arguably the
two most important rights in the bundle. When the Court
examined Lone Star’s ability to enforce, it noted the limitations
placed upon them by the Agreement. If Lone Star desired to file suit
against any entity that was not specifically listed as “unlicensed” it
would need to seek AMD’s consent.36 In other words, the Agreement did not provide a list of all unlicensed entities or simply identify some unlicensed entities, but rather the Agreement limited Lone
Star’s ability to sue without AMD’s permission to only those entities
listed in the exhibit. The Court labeled this a “hunting license.”37
The Court also noted that this enforcement restriction was coupled with AMD’s unrestricted right to sublicense the patents to any
unlisted litigation targets of Lone Star, and therefore indulge
infringement, which made Lone Star’s enforcement powers
prejudice defendants.’” Id. However, the Federal Circuit determined that “[u]ltimately once
the district court correctly concluded that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the
asserted patents to Lone Star, the district court should have considered whether AMD could
have been or needed to be joined before dismissing this case. Its failure to do so was legally
erroneous.” Id. at 1238–39. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and
remanded with an instruction that it consider whether AMD must be joined here. Id. at
1239.
32
Lone Star, at 1229; see Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 507–08.
33
Lone Star at 1230.
34
Id. at 1231.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1233.
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“illusory, at least in part.”38 Thus, the Agreement went beyond prohibiting Lone Star from suing any party that had a preexisting license, which in any event Lone Star could not do under the law,39
and instead limited Lone Star’s ability to sue only certain listed
entities. Further, the Agreement was more than a seller reserving the
right to sublicense to its affiliates or those with whom it has a specified business relationship.40 The Federal Circuit had previously
held that the retained right to sublicense affiliates is significantly
less important in the all substantial rights analysis than a seller’s
retained right to enforce the patent.41
Notably, the Court was not convinced by Lone Star’s argument
that restrictions on unlisted entities were irrelevant because all six
defendants were Unlicensed Third Party Entities. As the Federal
Circuit has previously held, the all substantial rights analysis is not
limited to the factual situation of the case before the court, but
rather, it considers the effect the agreement has on all substantial
rights, including those not at issue. The fact that a party “transferred
some rights, with respect to certain entities, does not mean it transferred all substantial rights in the full scope of the patent.”42 Limiting the licensee’s rights to enforce the patents to a specified list is
analogous to an exclusive “field of use” license, which restricts the
licensee’s use of the patent to a defined product or to a set geo-

38

Id. at 1231.
See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (explaining that license agreements “run with the patent” and are binding on
subsequent owners of the patent).
40
Cf, Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
41
See id. at 1350–51. The Court in Luminara concluded that Disney Enterprise’s
retained right to grant sublicenses to third-party affiliates (including any entity operated by
or under a license from The Walt Disney Company), did not preclude the transfer of all
substantial rights to Luminara. Id. Thus, Disney Enterprises’s retained right to license the
patent to third parties was not a substantial right, for the purposes of the all substantial
rights analysis. Id. The Court also stated that “[t]he retained right to practice a patent is not
the same as a retained right to exclude others from doing so.” Id. at 1351.
42
Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1232
(2019).
39
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graphical area.43 These “field of use” limitations have previously
been found “fatal” to the transfer of all substantial rights.44
Just as Lone Star had limitations placed on its ability to enforce
the patents, so too was its power to alienate restricted.45 First, Lone
Star was only allowed to transfer its rights to a third party if that
party agreed to be bound by the same enforcement restrictions as
Lone Star.46 Again, Lone Star was required to obtain AMD’s consent if it wished to transfer the patents unencumbered.47 The Court
found that “[n]ot only does this substantially restrict Lone Star’s
ability to transfer the patents, it ensures that AMD will always control how the patents are asserted”48 because, as discussed above, the
Agreement limited Lone Star’s ability to sue without AMD’s permission for all but those specifically listed entities. Thus, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, any restriction on
alienation must be read in the context of the entire agreement.
Second, the Court found that the requirement that Lone Star assign
the patents back to AMD before abandoning the patents was a limit
on Lone Star’s ability to alienate the patent that had the same impact
as the limit on transfer.49 These two restrictions in this Agreement
did much more than require that Lone Star comply with the law or
existing contractual obligations. Once again, in this context, the limitations placed on Lone Star’s power to do what it wished with the
patents was “fundamentally inconsistent with a transfer of all substantial rights.”50
The Federal Circuit also considered other aspects of the Agreement and found that these further supported the conclusion that Lone
Star did not have all substantial rights. One such factor was the
Agreement providing AMD with a significant share in any licensing
revenue Lone Star obtained for these patents, the Federal Circuit

43

See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 492 n.69.
See, e.g., Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
45
Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1232; see also Datatreasury, at 1372.
46
Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1232.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1233.
49
See id.
50
Id.
44
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having previously held that “the fact that [the transferor] retains a
substantial share of the proceeds is consistent with [transferor’s] retaining ownership rights in the patent . . . .”51
In sum, when Lone Star licensed the patents from AMD it did
not receive an unfettered right to enforce the patents. The limitations
placed on Lone Star, including what the Court considered two of the
most important rights within the bundle, led the Court to conclude
that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the patents. Therefore, Lone Star could not assert the patents in its own name alone.
The case was remanded to the district court with an instruction
to consider whether AMD must be joined to continue the case.52
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Lone Star fits squarely within
the framework previously established by the Federal Circuit under
the all substantial rights doctrine. Lone Star further makes clear the
most important rights within the bundle and reiterates that only
the owner of all substantial rights in the patent may bring suit on
its own.53
Further, the holding in Lone Star highlights important considerations for patent practitioners. Specifically, when structuring agreements, parties who desire that the licensee be allowed to bring an
infringement suit in its name alone should be mindful of the rights
within the “bundle” that the Federal Circuit has made clear are the
most important and ensure that those rights remain unencumbered
by restrictions or limitations imposed by the licensor.54 The Court’s
decision in Lone Star has further emphasized the importance of a
licensee or buyer’s unfettered right to enforce their patents, indulge
infringement, and alienate their patents.

51
52
53
54

Id. (quoting Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1239.
See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 481.
See generally Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1.

